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Some scholarly attention has now been directed both at the 
basic integrative processes operative in the formation of large 
centralized states in Southern and Central Africa during the Mfecane 
and at the development of segmentary characteristics within them after 
they were established. (1) However, the collateral problem of pre- 
Mfecane social and political carry-overs in these new multi-tribal 
societies has virtually been ignored (2) ,despite the inherent 
improbability of complete integration within the lifetimes of people 
whose basic attitudes and loyalties had been formed before they became 
incorporated in the newly organized kingdoms. It is curious that the 
problems of detribalization and national integration experienced by 
socially heterogeneous African states in our own day have not 
encouraged more study of earlier parallels, but this too may be a 
legacy of the long preoccupation with European "penetration" and 
African "response". The sources are also exceptionally poor because 
the whole apparatus of kingship was necessarily committed to suppression 
of pre-existing clan and tribal alignments, and few white observers 
were afterwards able to identify the diverse ethnic components of the 
new states. The earlier history of m a n y  of these factions has also 
been obscured by the radical social dislocation of the Mfecane, and it 
is often very difficult to determine the parent groups and previous 
relationships of many lineages which exercised great influence in the 
new kingdoms. This paper is, therefore, merely a preliminary attempt 
to trace the pre-Mfecane origins of a deeply rooted social and 
political cleavage in the Ndebele kingdom of Mzilikazi, a Mfecane 
conquest state in which the socially homogeneous core was extremely 
small. 
Conflicts between the diverse peoples who had been 
incorporated in the Ndebele kingdom were ordinarily controlled and 
concealed by the machinery and trappings of royal absolutism. The 
Ndebele identified themselves as abantu benkosi, "the people of the 
king" ( 3 ) ,  and most of the visible forms and rituals of social and 
political life were designed to enhance his status and authority. The 
protocol of relations between ruler and subject (4), the great annual 
inxwala ceremonies (5), and the invocation of rain during the dry 
season (6) were all important examples of ritual behaviour which 
glorified the kingship. There was also substantial institutional 
centralization. The national councils in which the chief men were 
represented could only advise the king and receive his commands under 
the constitution, and the officers of the regiments and divisions 
which constituted the principal administrative as well as military 
units were all formally appointed by the king. (7) He dominated the 
administration of justice ( 8 ) ,  controlled foreign relations (g), and 
directed the military power which was the rationale and pride of the 
nation. (10) These prerogatives, together with the hospitality and 
patronage which made the court the centre of social as well as political 
life (U), all served to focus public attention on the king and most 
contemporary white observers concluded that he was an absolute 
despot. (12) 
This concentration of power and prestige in the kingship 
clearly reflected a strong common desire for the military advantages 
which discipline and strong leadership provided, but the very fact that 
such an elaborate system of social control was thought to be necessary 
in order to achieve these advantages indicates that unity and discipline 
must have been very hard to obtain. This impression is confirmed by 
examination of the actual political process (13), which can only be 
described as anarchic. Although constitutionally subordinate, the 
powerful izinduna who commanded the regiments and divisions had great 
freedom of action in practice. They often encroached on royal 
prerogatives with relative impunity, and there were many instances 
where they shaped national policy by bringing pressure to bear on the 
king behind the scenes. (14) Their ability to influence policy was, 
however, severely limited by their individual ambitions and factional 
rivalries. Every induna knew that 
jealous eyes are upon him. His equals in 
rank and station covet his possessions, 
=d ragard the favours which he receives 
from the chief as so much personal loss to 
themselves. Therefore the head men are 
continually plotting and counte~plotting 
against one another. (15) 
Personal rivalries of this type ordinarily helped to prevent the 
izinduna from combining against the king (16), but the domestic 
political situation was further complicated by continuing lineage 
interests and rivalries which sometimes provided a broad basis for 
opposition to the ruling Khwnalo clan. 
The Ndebele nation had been forged within living memory from 
more than thirty-five distinct groups of N p i ,  Sotho, and Shona 
speaking peoples who had little else in common except the kingship and 
the military successes it had achieved. (17) Many of the Nguni peoples 
were refugees from formerly independent polities which had been broken 
up during the Mfecane, while a numerical majority of the population 
were probably captive Sotho and Shona speakers who had been 
incorporated by force, During the formative period of the eighteen 
twenties and thirties, Mzilikazi and his heavily outnumbered Khumalo 
clan tried to forestall challenges to their dominance and to minimize the 
danger of anarchy by eliminating potential rivals in the leadership of 
the high status Nguni refugee groups which amalgamated with them, and 
by forcibly assimilating only the children of Sotho and Shona 
captives. (18) These preliminary measures were followed up by a 
thorough-going progranme of linguistic, social and political 
integration which continued throughout the history of the nation. (19) 
This progranme of national integration worked well enough to 
ensure that rival factions sought satisfaction by struggling for control 
of the kingship instead of through secession (20), but pre-existing 
factional interests were never eliminated. The king's own hereditary 
followers were so swamped by amalgamation with large and sometimes 
still fairly cohesive groups of Nguni refugees in the eighteen twenties 
and thirties that the rapidly expanding kingdom soon lost most of its 
original Khumalo identity. Many of these newcomers had no previous 
connection with the Khumalo, and it was probably due to their influence 
that the name "Amasiligazi",used by Mzilikaziss followers in the 
eighteen twenties,was eventually abandoned in favour of the impersonal 
descriptive term "Ndebele", coined by their Sotho victims and 
captives. (21) The need for political co-operation and rapid 
organization meant that m a n y  of the refugee bands had to be 
incorporated into the military and administrative structure of the 
rapidly expanding kingdom en masse, despite the long-term danger to 
Khumalo supremacy and national integration. As a result, pre-existing 
social groups and alignments often seem to have been perpetuated in 
the early Ndebele regiments (22), many of which retained their identities 
and fighting strength throughout the subsequent history of the nation. (23) 
Anthropological evidence shows that the old social and political 
associations were not forgotten (24), and the traditional hereditary 
principle seems generally to have ensured that command of the 
regiments remained in the lineages of the headmen who were originally 
confirmed as izinduna, despite the king's formal power of 
appointment. r
These traditional ties and loyalties were often superseded by 
new political interests and relationships which developed after the 
kingdom was re-established in south central Africa in the early 
eighteen forties, and lineage connections alone do not seem to have had 
aay consistent influence on behaviour beyond the third or fourth 
generations. (26) These variables, together with the failure of most 
white observers to distinguish between different factions, make it 
extremely difficult to reconstruct the politics of kinship and corporate 
interests in the Ndebele kingdom during the later pre-colonial period. 
It is, however, clear from the evidence available that pre-existing 
social and political alignments were at least partly responsible for 
the development of a factional cleavage which permanently polarized 
Ndebele society and profoundly influenced the pattern of black-white 
relations during the decisive years between 1869 and 1889. 
'Phis cleavage had its roots in the early years of the 
nineteenth century, when the section of the northern Khumalo ruled by 
Mzilikazirs father, Mashobana, were forced to acknowledge the 
overlordship of the powerful Ndwandwe king, Zwide. One of his 
daughters was installed as Mashobana's chief wife in order to cement 
the vassal relationship and protect Ndwandwe interests, but the 
IOzumalo were subsequently suspected of intriguing with Zwidefs great 
rival Dingiswayo, and Nashobana was executed about 1818. Zwide 
attempted to retain contml by confirming Meilikazi as the new chief ot 
the Khumalo and giving h i m  another dau&ter as chief wife, but 
Mzilikazi rebelled soon a f t e r  and a l l ied  himself with the mtpidly 
r ising Zulu kingdom of Shaka. (27) This was evidently merely a 
tact ical  manoeuvre because Mzilikazi defied Shaka and fled north into 
the Transvaal at the f i r s t  opportunity, about 1823, i n  order to become 
independent. (28) The naacent Ndebele kingdom was never again in range 
of Zwidels armies, but other manifestations of the Ndwandwe threat were 
not so easily avoided. When Zwidets succeaaor, Sikunyana, was defeated 
by %aka in 1826, "Mzilikazi reaped a rich harvest in this f inal  b3 eak- 
up of the Ndwandwe clan; for  large numbers of its men and women, 
k o w i n g  nowhere else to go, betook themselves to him and added 
considerable strength to his evepgrowing tribeu. (29) But they also 
brou@;ht serious problem because they came in great numbers (30)  and 
because some of them, at l e m t ,  were s t i l l  well enough organized t o  form 
complete regiments i n  the new Amnyama division, then being raised in  the 
Transvaal, (31) 
The domestic poli t ical  implications of the Ndwandwe influx 
into the Ndebele k i e o m  f i r s t  became evident when the nation migmted 
north f r o m  the 'Pransvaal into South Central Africa in the late eighteen 
thi r t ies .  The host s p l i t  i n t o  two seations in  northern Botswana as 
k i l i k a z i  began a two-year odyssey north along the fringes of ttte 
Kalahari desert with the Amloghe and Igabha divisions, a.nd Gunawane 
Ndiweni and Mzilikazi's heir, Nkuluma,na, started directly towards the 
high veld of South Central Africa with the Amyama and Amd&wub 
divisions. There a m  many apparent contradiotiom in the surviving 
accounts of this period of mi$ration and resettlement, but most sources 
agree that Gundwane and a number of the other izinduna of the Amnyana. 
division, together with Mzilikazi~s chief wife decided to install 
Nkulumana as lring i n  his  fatherts absence. (32 j  It is possible, as some 
of the accounts suggest, that these kingsnakera acted in the belief 
that Mzilikazi was dead, but i t  seems more likely that pre-existing 
clan and t r ibal  interests,  which had no traditional lixllrs with the 
Khumalo, were simply taking advantage of an apparently favoxmble 
opportunity for  throwing off what the Ndwandwe a t  least  must have 
regaxded as a humiliating yoke. 
If there were really solid grounds for believing h i l i k a z i  to 
be dead, a l l  the p u p s  with Gundwane would presumably have supported the 
candidacy of Nktllmaa, who was unquestionably the legitimate heir,  but 
several regiments of the Amnyana and JmaMm&t diviaians evidently refused 
t o  go along w i t h  Gmdwxmefs p l w .  The opposition of these unaonvinced 
regiments, most of which seem to have had izinduaa who were d i rec t ly  
connected with the Rlrumalo (33).  suggests that bdw&ne and his 
associates were playing a deepex m e .  The key to the problem would 
seem t o  l i e  i n  the genealogy of Nkuluma,na., who shared the Khumalo 
i a i b o w  because the Nguni were patrilineal,but who a lso  had close 
connections with the Ndwdwe thm@ his mother, a da.u&ter of Zwide. 
The p r i n c s ~ s  own views are unrecorded, but it seams likely that his  
mother's attitudes had a dominaat influence on him becauae he was 
apparently s t i l l  l iving at her Icraal, surrounded by her people, whereas 
he must not have seen his  father fo r  at least the last two o r  three of 
M E  twelve o r  foWeen rears. (74) Direct Wornation about his 
motherrs motivations is lacking, but the circum&antial evidence 
strongly suggests that she was eager to subs-t;itute her Ndwandwe son 
for her Khumalo husband. She was said to have been actively involved 
in the decision to promote Nkul- as king, despite the opposition of 
the Khwnalo izinduna,, and it seems that she and her kraal were 
afterwards purged along with N k u l w  and Gundwaner s p u p ,  (35) This 
evidence appears to be confimed by the account of Mzilikazits 
reappe-ce collected by Thomas Morgan Thomas in the eighteen sixties: 
Umzilikazi, unable to forgive or forget 
Uswiti [Zwide] for killing his father, 
Umatjobana, was determined not to allow 
the grcmdson of the murderer to become 
his successor. When therefore Unkulumana  
arrived at about twelve years of age, and 
those families who would be mostly benefited 
by his accession to the sovereignty begm 
to speak of him as the heir apparent, he 
was put to death by order of his father. (56) 
Mzilikazi met the challenge to his authority by secretly purging all 
the princes of Zwidels lineage along with their Ndwandwe mother ( 3 7 ) ,  
and by executing the izinduna who had llspoiledll N rulumana. (38) 
Subsequent communal conflict was suppressed during Mzilikazits lifetime 
by ruthless use of the judicial and police powers of the kingship (39), 
as well as by his unpaxalleled personal influence and prestige as a 
great warrior king and founder of the nation. (40) 
These measures restrained the oppo~itioiz but they could not 
eliminate it. The Ndwandwe faction was much too large and important to 
be destroyed root m d  branch, and Nkul-ts adherents remained 
strongly entrenched in the regiments of the Amnyama and Amakhanda 
divisions. The most fervent of these irreconcilables were associated 
with the elite regiments of a sub-section of Amnyama commanded by T/lbiko 
Masuku, an extremely ambitious man with close Ndwandwe connections. 
Mbiko was said originally to have joined kilikaai with an orgaaized 
regiment, the Tmpaagela, which was afterwards purged for its part in 
Gundwaneta scheme. (41) By that time Mbiko had evidemly become induna 
of the Zwwndaba regiment, to which Nkulumana was attached, and both 
Zwaqpndaba and another Amnyama reglment,called Induba, were said to 
have been present when Nkulumana was achowledged as king. (42) The 
Indtuba and sevesal other retzinents were also connected with Nkulumanats 
cause through their iaind&. Tshukisa Mafu, induna of Induba some 
time before 1870, was apparently of the same lineage as a man named 
Dolo PiIaf'u who was executed with Gundwane, Tshukisa Mafu was also a 
brother of Dambisamamzba Mafu, indum of the Godlwo regiment of 
Anmyama division, who was sentenced to death in 1840 but escaped to the 
east where another p u p  of Nd-we refugees under Soshangana had 
become established. (43) The pemonal md political ambitions of these 
men md the regiments they led depended on Nkulumanals claim to the 
kingship and they continued to believe, or at least assert, that the 
prince had merely been sent into exile until Nzilikazits death. (44) 
These claims could not be pressed while the old king. lived, but they 
were kept in readinass for the time when his dominating presence would 
be removed and the Ndwandwe faction would have another chance to wrest 
control of the kingdom from the Khumalo. That this was no idle threat 
became clear during the succession crisis of 1869-70, when the old 
cleavage reopened into an unbridgeable gulf between the faction which 
"represented the house of Uswiti  wide], or that to which Unkulumana 
belonged, and the others [who] consisted of the houses of Ukumalo and 
Umswazi , with which Ulopengula was connec tedn . (45) 
Thomasr conclusion that political alignments during the 
succession crisis of 1869-70 were largely determined by lineage 
connections appears to be borne out by detailed examination of the 
behaviour of individual regiments and izinduna. A number of the 
regiments in all of the divisions were evidently influenced by 
calculations of political expediency. But it is striking that nearly 
all of Nkulwnanars supporters apparently belonged to a few lineages like 
Mafu and Masuku which had a long history of political dissidence, while 
practically everyone in the lineages connected either with the Khumalo 
or with Lobengulafs maternal kin seems to have given him unhesitating 
support. (46) The proximate cause of this somewhat surprising 
adherence to traditional patterns of political alignment, despite the 
intensive and in many ways highly successful nation-building of the 
previous decades, was probably the kings! continuing inability to 
resist the claims of vested lineage interests and hereditary right in 
exercising their prerogative powers of appointment. (47) The 
possibility of accumulating power along with wealth implicit in the 
treatment of public offices as heritable property seems to have 
prevented axty substantial devaluation of lineage interests and 
connections as the basic currency of political calculations, despite 
the fact that the regiment had replaced the chiefdom as the principal 
unit of administrative organization. This does not mean that pre- 
existing lineage rivalries were the basic cause of domestic conflict 
in the Ndebele kingdom. There is abundant evidence that questions of 
office and influence, precedence and perquisites, distribution of 
military spoils and imported manufactured goods, and changes in the 
domestic as well as foreign balance of power were, in fact, the 
dominant issues which divided the nation throughout its history in 
South Central Africa. But close examination of the actual political 
process in the Ndebele kingdom suggests that these issues generally 
continued to be defined in terms of lineage interests and connections 
because there was still no convincing alternative. Dissident factions 
in Ndebele society did attempt to exploit the missionary message for 
domestic political purposes, and there were already occasional signs of 
class tensions arising from the new economic opportunities engendered by 
contact with the European commercial economy, but neither development 
had gone far enough to permit effective political organization on an 
ideological or class basis. The continuing weakness of the new social, 
territorial, and corporate loyalties meant that lineage claims and 
connections were still the principal criteria by which social and 
political interest groups in Ndebele domestic politics were defined. 
This principle was modified somewhat at the national level by the 
effects of the patronage system, but the major factions which sought to 
influence and control the kingship continued to be organized around the 
networks of lineage relationships which linked them with the legitimate 
hereditary claims of one or other of the senior branches of the royal 
family. More research will be needed to determine just how common a 
pattern this was among the Mfecane conquest states, but there seems to 
have been a remarkable parallel in the Swazi kingdom, where Ndwandwe 
claims and lineage connections also reportedly acted as a focus of 
opposition to the ruling lineage and its allies. (48) 
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